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Argument
I.

Just cause was established for Smith's discharge.

The Workforce Appeals Board (the Board) argues in its brief that the Employment
Security Act is to be liberally construed, and that not every legitimate cause for discharge
justifies a denial of benefits. Yet, the case cited in support of this principle also holds
that "the rule is that mere inefficiency or failure of good performance as the result of
inability or incapacity, inadvertences, isolated instances of ordinary negligence, or goodfaith errors in judgment or decisions do not constitute culpable conduct." Logan
Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 429, 723 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). The Supreme Court
of Utah then emphasized that it was the "concept of culpable conduct or fault" critical to
determinations in this area. Id. The Board attempts to cast this case as a single instance
of poor judgment inadequate to harm the employer. Smith's conduct in this case was not
a good-faith error in judgment, ordinary negligence, inefficiency, or some other failure,
but the victimization of a thirteen year old child. This was conduct far removed from the
work errors contemplated by the Court in Logan Regional Hospital. In light of Smith's
numerous admissions to the conduct and the totality of the record before the Board, any
conclusion that his choice to touch the girl was anyone's fault but Smith's is
unreasonable and irrational.
a. The City has demonstrated Smith's culpability.
The Board concedes that there is no dispute as to the seriousness of Smith's
conduct in this case, and then contends that Provo City Corporation (the City) failed to
l
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demonstrate culpability by failing to show any real or potential harm to the City. But the
Board's opinion on this score rests squarely on the factual finding, disputed on appeal,
that there is insufficient evidence in the record to prove Smith's touching of the child was
illegal or inappropriate, which even Smith himself termed "disgraceful" in his brief to the
Board. The Board argues that since the City did not show that Smith might, in the future,
leave his shift, trespass on residential dwellings, and molest children, no real or potential
harm was demonstrated. This argument presupposes that the potential harm to the
employer can only be a repetition of the serious conduct during work hours, and ignores
other harm to the City included in the record and presented to the Administrative Law
Judge.
Once the City had concluded from its investigation that Smith had in fact touched
the girl inappropriately based in part on his admission, it faced a dilemma if it continued
to employ Smith. The City could either, with full knowledge, allow an accused child
molester to work in residential neighborhoods, or place him on some kind of
administrative leave. The first option was not tenable to the City, because it
independently substantiated the accusations against Smith and expected him to be
convicted, and knew of his admission. The Court need only suppose for a moment what
sort of damage that would do to a municipality if it became widely known that the City
continued to employ such an individual in residential neighborhoods. The damage to
goodwill alone is adequate harm to show jeopardy to the City's rightful interest, let alone
the potential civil liability if Smith had continued as an employee and committed another
offense while on duty. If the City had taken the second option and removed Smith from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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the streets, it would have been left paying his salary while necessarily paying another
employee to perform the actual labor he should have been doing, a direct financial harm
to the City. In the alternative, the City could have placed Smith on unpaid administrative
leave, and hired another employee to do his work. But this would not have protected the
City from the harm to goodwill of retaining such an employee where charges had been
substantiated administratively and by admission. Accordingly, because of the seriousness
of Smith's conduct, the City had no choice but to terminate him to protect its rightful
interest as set forth by rule. UTAH ADMIN. R. 994-405-202(1). All of these reasons were
set forth before the Administrative Law Judge and before the Board, but were ignored.
R. 59, 73. Ultimately, Smith's choice to touch the thirteen year old female forced the
City to take action, and nothing else.
The Board relies on Gibson v. Department of Employment Security and US WEST
Communications, Inc. in support of the idea that the adjudicator must balance work
record, length of employment, and repeated conduct against the seriousness of the offense
and the harm to the employer. The Gibson case provides an excellent contrast with this
case in terms of seriousness of conduct. In that case, the claimant was terminated for
inappropriately disclosing a requested tap and trace to document harassing phone calls.
840 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court determined that the Board below
failed to adequately consider other factors in addition to seriousness, and so reversed and
allowed benefits. Id. at 785. Gibson does not stand for the premise that the seriousness
of the conduct should be ignored, or that the most serious of any conduct could not
overcome a strong record, length of employment, and other factors. Otherwise, Gibson
3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would produce a chilling effect the other direction and upset the balance contemplated by
the Court. This Court has determined that "when the employee has a clean work record
and there is little chance the conduct will be repeated, a more serious offense and more
harm to the employer will be necessary to show culpability." Fieeiki v. Dep't of
Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 398,12, 122 P.3d 706. There can be little question that
the groping of a thirteen year old female is more serious conduct than ignorantly
disclosing a tap and trace as occurred in Gibson. Smith's conduct is so serious that it
pushes the balance to the side of seriousness and harm in spite of his lengthy employment
and clean work history.
The Board relies on Southeastern Utah Association of Local Governments v.
Workforce Appeals Board and Lane v. Board of Review to emphasize work record, length
of employment, and probability of repeated conduct and minimize the seriousness of
Smith's actions. Both cases are distinguishable from that before the Court. In
Southeastern, the claimant was socializing and drinking with coworkers when she made
sexually explicit comments to a coworker and touched his buttocks. 2007 UT App 20, f
2, 155 P.3d 932. Southeastern is distinguishable because Smith's actions, perpetrated
against a child, are significantly more serious. While the employer in Southeastern could
have avoided further harm by training and discipline, training and discipline could not
undo the future harm to the City of continuing to employ a person for work in residential
neighborhoods who had committed a sexual offense, or the harm of putting him on leave
while his criminal case proceeded in terms of finances, goodwill, reputation, and trust for
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the City. Smith's single act had much graver ramifications than those of the claimant in
Southeastern,
In Lane, the claimant was fired for selling beer to a minor. 727 P.2d 206, 207
(Utah 1986). The case can be distinguished because the conduct is nowhere near as
serious as Smith's, and because the Court determined that the claimant's acts were not
intentional, as were Smith's. Id. at 211. The Board cites this case for the idea that "the
degree of culpability which will disqualify an employee from receiving benefits involves
'volitional acts by an employee who could not have been heedless of their
consequences.'" Id. at 211, quoting Clearfield City v. Department of Employment
Security, 663 P.2d at 444. But this idea supports the City, and not the Board. Smith's
touching of a minor was a volitional act of which he could not have been heedless of the
potential consequences.
The Board suggests that the City could have imposed a lesser form of discipline
and corrected Smith's behavior, and so just cause was not demonstrated. The City's
arguments before the Administrative Law Judge set forth why this is not so. R. 59. If
Smith had been placed on formal probation, the City would still have had to deal with the
resulting harm that an accused child sex abuser would be working for the City in
residential neighborhoods. This is not an illusionary harm. Retaining Smith without
having him perform the work was also financially untenable. Once the City had
substantiated the charge through its own investigation and Smith's admission, it had no
choice but to discharge him to protect its rightful interest because Smith's conduct was so
serious. Thus, Smith was culpable. "[A] single violation . . . may be sufficient to show .
5
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. . potential harm to the employer's interests." Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129,
1134 (Utah 1985). It is difficult to contemplate a more serious single violation than that
committed by Smith.
The Board attempts to distinguish this case from the Fieeki decision, on the
rationale that the police officer's domestic violence was more directly involved with the
employer's interest of combating violence. Without citing authority, the Board again
attempts to narrow the idea of what constitutes an employer's rightful interest. This
concept flies in the face of applicable rule cited in the Fieeki opinion:
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses that take place on the employer's
premises or during business hours. However, it is necessary that the offense be
connected to the employment in such a manner that it is a subject of legitimate and
significant concern to the employer. Employers generally have the right to expect
that employees will refrain from acts detrimental to the business or that would
bring dishonor to the business name or institution. Legitimate interests of
employers include: goodwill, efficiency, employee morale, discipline, honesty and
trust.
UTAH ADMIN. R. 994-405-207. It cannot seriously be argued that touching a thirteen year
old female in the manner presented on the record is not detrimental to the City under this
rule. Since this is so, Fieeki remains the most applicable case to the facts presented here,
and favors a finding that the Board erred. It can be nothing less than a legitimate and
significant concern to the City that one of its employees, who frequented residential
neighborhoods alone, had committed such an offense as Smith admitted to a number of
times. Any action short of discharge in this case would have been inadequate given the
circumstances, particularly when considering the detrimental nature of Smith's acts, even
if not repeated later, to the City's goodwill. Additionally, the City had legitimate and
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significant concern for the negative impact on the trust Provo citizens could place in the
City had Smith been retained, once the City had substantiated the conduct as the
employer had done in Fieeki, before criminal charges had run their course. Smith's
conduct carries a pejorative connotation in society and would have brought dishonor to
the City had he been retained after the City substantiated the accusations against him.
The Board mischaracterizes the City's argument in its brief as challenging a
finding that Smith's actions may not have been illegal or inappropriate. While the
caption to Part I-a in the City's brief supports this interpretation, the body of the Part
clearly takes issue with the finding that there was insufficient evidence in the record
before the Administrative Law Judge to prove that the touching was in fact illegal or even
inappropriate. Brief of Appellant, 8-12. The Board did make such a finding, and there is
not substantial evidence in the record to support that finding as set forth in the Brief of
Appellant.
The Board takes issue with the City declining to submit evidence of Smith's
conviction on reconsideration. The City addressed this issue in Part II of the Brief of
Appellant, and will not burden the Court with a repetition of the rationale for that tactical
decision aside from referring the Court to that Part, and asserting that Utah Code Sections
35A-4-405(2)(a) and 35A-4-405(2)(b) would be rendered a nullity for behavior outside
the workplace if a discharge with an admission like the one in this case is inadequate to
demonstrate just cause, or inadequate to show that the conduct was deliberate, willful,
and wanton, or inadequate to allow for termination under subsection (b). Surely the
legislature did not intend this result.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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The Board contends that the Board did not apply a criminal standard of proof.
This contention is not supported by the record. The Board argues that it merely was
inquiring into whether Smith had actually committed the crime to determine whether the
seriousness of the offense was high for a culpability determination, while conceding
elsewhere that there "is no dispute the seriousness of the alleged offense in this case is
great." Brief of Appellee at 8. The Board's opinion does not support the contention that
the inquiry was for seriousness only. The Board indicated that "the Claimant is entitled,
as is everyone else, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty." R. 95. The
presumption of innocence in a criminal case is indicative of the heavy burden on the
prosecution to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not a criminal
proceeding, and the Board should have proceeded under a preponderance of the evidence
standard. The words of the Board contradict an assertion that the Board was applying
anything but a criminal standard, particularly when viewed in light of the whole record,
which includes ample evidence that Smith actually committed the crime charged, while
no evidence outside of speculation supports the Board's finding that it is possible that the
touching was not illegal or inappropriate. If the Board had appropriately applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard, it would have determined that Smith was
culpable. There is no direct evidence in the record that Smith did not engage in the
conduct which gave rise to the criminal case, but there is direct evidence that he did
engage in the conduct.
The Board then takes issue with the City's reliance on the probable cause
statement, but once again ignores the other evidence on the record that Smith did in fact
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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commit the conduct for which he was discharged. In addition to the statement, which
includes Smith's initial admission, Smith admitted on his benefits application to
admitting to the crime. R. 6. He also affirmed his admission before the Administrative
Law Judge. R. 55. There was evidence before the Administrative Law Judge elicited
through testimony of an investigating officer that the touching was inappropriate. R. 5255. The idea that the probable cause statement is the only evidence and is somehow
insufficient, in light of the whole record, places the Board's finding of insufficient
evidence in the record to prove that the touching was illegal or inappropriate outside the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Both in the Board's opinion and in the Brief of
Appellee, all other indicators that the touching was illegal and inappropriate are ignored,
while all assertions that the touching may have been otherwise are based on speculation
and imagination. Liberally construing the Employment Security Act does not mean the
Board had to ignore all other evidence presented, including that of the victim and
investigating officers in this case, in favor of supposition, assumption, or contemplated
possibility in favor of Smith completely unsupported by any evidence. For these reasons,
the Board's opinion was unreasonable and irrational and should be reversed.
The Board next takes issue with the City's interpretation of Utah Code Section
35A-4-405(2)(b) on the grounds that Smith's admission together with other facts in this
case could not give rise to termination because the conduct was not in connection with
work. This assertion is based on a narrow reading of Utah Administrative Rule 994-405207. The Board has cited no authority for the concept that in order for the conduct to be
in connection with claimant's work, the connection to work must be direct and explicit.
9 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The language of the rule in its entirety does not bear out this interpretation. The rule
makes it clear that the conduct need not occur during work hours or at a work. UTAH
ADMIN. R. 994-405-207. "Employers generally have the right to expect that employees
will refrain from acts detrimental to the business or that would bring dishonor to the
business name or institution." Id. Smith himself describes his conduct as "disgraceful"
and hurtful. R. 78. It is a subject of legitimate and significant concern to an employer to
continue to maintain an employment relationship when such conduct is known to the
employer. It would be disgraceful to the City to knowingly continue the employment of a
power line worker who had committed such an act and send him into residential
neighborhoods. This case is again similar in this respect to the Fieeki case. Reading the
rule as narrowly as the Board urges would mean that an employee could not be
terminated for criminal conduct which the employee admitted to, before conviction,
unless the connection of the conduct with work was explicit and direct. Interpreting the
rule in this manner would render the statute for discharge for commission of a crime
meaningless except for cases with a criminal conviction. Interpreting the statute so
narrowly defeats both the disjunctive language of Utah Code Section 35A-4-405(2)(b)
allowing for discharge with an admission along with other facts and the language of
Administrative Rule 994-405-207 and its definition of connection with work.
b. The City has demonstrated Smith's knowledge of the City's
expectations.
The Board contends that Smith did not intentionally or knowingly disregard City
policy. This contention again presupposes that Smith's touching of the victim was
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somehow appropriate, while this finding as challenged on appeal, and while there is
ample evidence in the record that the touching was inappropriate. Moreover, the Board
mischaracterizes the City policy in regard to behavior as not containing any language in
regard to comportment outside of work. The policy actually reads that employees "are
expected at all times to conduct themselves in a positive manner so as to promote the best
interests of the City," and the policy explicitly includes "[r]efraining from behavior or
conduct deemed offensive or undesirable, or which is contrary to the City's best interest."
R. 9 (emphasis added). The policy also explicitly states that conduct which "discredits
the City, or is offensive to the public or fellow employees cannot be tolerated." Id. The
plain language of the policy indicates that it applies outside of work.
Moreover, it strains credulity to assert that Smith did not know committing a
sexual crime against a child might result in termination. Applicable rule states that
"[gjenerally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a clear
explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a
violation of a universal standard of conduct." UTAH ADMIN. R. 994-405-202(2). This
Court has deemed far less offensive conduct to be a violation of a universal standard of
conduct. The Court has deemed driving a company car on a suspended license to be such
a violation. Smith v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2011 UT App 68, 252 P.3d 372. So, too,
has the Court characterized swearing within hearing of customers and walking off a shift.
Bhatia v. Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 574 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In
this case, not only did the City have a clear written policy, but Smith's action violated a
universal standard of conduct. It cannot be reasonably argued that touching a thirteen
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
11 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

year old female in the way described before the Administrative Law Judge by an
investigating officer, and at least partially admitted to by Smith numerous times, does not
violate a universal standard of conduct. It is generally expected that people in society
will not engage in that type of conduct. Therefore, Smith had knowledge and the Board
should be reversed as to the knowledge element of the just cause determination.
c. The City has proved the element of control.
The Board relies on its arguments as they relate to knowledge to contend that, since
Smith was unaware that the City expected him to refrain from sexually abusing a child
outside of work time, that he had no control over whether or not his conduct adhered to
expectations. As set forth above, it is not tenable to argue that conduct of the kind
engaged in by Smith is the type that requires a written policy. It is commonly understood
that such behavior is unacceptable. Instead of making the control issue dependent on
knowledge as the Board seeks to do, the rule states that u[t]he conduct causing the
discharge must have been within the claimant's control." UTAH ADMIN. R. 994-405202(3). The record is completely devoid of any evidence whatsoever that Smith touching
the thirteen year old female was somehow outside of his control. Smith's brief to the
Board demonstrates that he had control of his conduct. R. 78. His assertion that it did
not negatively impact his "employer or in any part to do [his] job or responsibilities" is
correct, but the assertion is correct because he was discharged, not because his conduct
was not serious. If he had not been discharged, the City would have felt the negative
impact, dishonor, and loss of goodwill and trust from its citizens, for continuing to
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employ a person in residential neighborhoods who had inappropriately touched a thirteen
year old child while the City knew the conduct had taken place.
II.

The City has appropriately marshaled the evidence.

The Board then argues that the City has failed to marshal the evidence as required in
an appeal of this nature. But this argument is incorrect because the City did marshal the
evidence. The City invoked both case law and Appellate Rule to set forth the standard
which the Board has elaborated on. Brief of Appelant at 8. The City has challenged a
very specific factual finding that there "is insufficient evidence in the record before the
Administrative Law Judge to prove that the touching was in fact illegal or inappropriate."
R. 95. The Board complains that the City did not "present in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818
P.2d. 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). Yet this is precisely what the City has done.
The Board's factual finding in this context is somewhat unusual. Since the Board had
found that there was insufficient evidence in the record, the City's advocacy of that
position was reduced to proving a negative. The City could have argued that there is no
evidence in the record to show that Smith's touching was illegal or inappropriate, but that
assertion is not true or accurate. Since the City could not prove the absence of evidence
which was not in fact absent, the alternative was to set forth any items on the record
supporting an interpretation that Smith's conduct may have been appropriate or legal.
The City set forth every instance in the record that even remotely can be construed as
evidence that Smith's conduct may have been appropriate or legal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Because the Board's finding of insufficiency was unreasonable and irrational, it
cannot be defended outside of listing those instances where half-hearted denials of
wrongdoing occurred on the record. It is impossible to take up a devil's advocate
position by pointing to the record and asserting that the evidence of inappropriateness and
illegality is not there, when it is there. The Board made a finding of insufficiency, but did
not articulate the finding. If the Board's opinion included language that Detective
Turnbow's testimony was deemed not credible by the Administrative Law Judge, it might
be defended. If the Board's opinion stated that the probable cause statement was for
whatever reason not credible evidence, it might be defended. If the Board's opinion
stated that Smith's admissions could not be considered, the finding of insufficiency might
be defended. In short, if the Board had affirmed a finding by the Administrative Law
Judge, or determined on its own, that evidence indicating illegality and inappropriateness
was not credible and therefore not considered, then the insufficiency finding could be
defended.
But this was not the case. Instead, and as noted in the Brief of Appellant, the City
was left to argue that the record lacked evidence that Smith's conduct was illegal or
inappropriate. That position is indefensible. It is not possible to prove an insufficiency
when no insufficiency exists. Nevertheless, the City pored over every line of the record
and included in the Brief of Appellant each instance where any scrap or hint was given
that Smith's conduct may have been legal or appropriate. The Board complains that the
City has pointed to no evidence on the record showing that the finding of insufficiency
was against the weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous. This is not accurate. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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City set forth a multitude of evidence in the record that demonstrates a finding of
insufficiency is clearly erroneous. Brief of Appelant, at 9-12. Accordingly, the City has
met the marshaling requirement and the Board should be reversed.

Conclusion
Contrary to the findings of the Board, there was not insufficient evidence in the
record to demonstrate Smith's actions were illegal or inappropriate. This Court should
reverse the Board on that finding. The City has adequately set forth culpability,
knowledge, and control contrary to the Board's conclusions. The City has adequately
marshaled the evidence supporting a finding of insufficiency. The Board's finding is
erroneous. Since this is so, the Board should be reversed and benefits should be denied.
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